负债融资、代理冲突与企业投资决策研究

Research on Debt Financing,Agency Conflicts and Enterprise Investment Decisions

采用实物期权方法,研究了股东债权人代理冲突下负债融资对企业投资行为的影响,并进一步分析了负债融资约束下的投资决策问题。数值计算显示,与无负债企业相比,杠杆企业具有过度投资倾向以加快实现负债融资所带来的利息税盾价值;与企业价值最大化策略相比,在股东权益最大化目标下,股东具有较早执行投资期权的动机,影响投资期权价值和最优财务杠杆的选择,并侵害了债权人的利益。当存在负债融资约束时,投资临界点表现出先下降后上升的趋势。

This paper examines the impact of debt finance over the enterprise investment behavior using the real option method under stockholder-bondholder conflicts and debt constraint on the investment trigger. Numerical solutions show that stockholders choose to exercise the investment option too early compared to the unleveled enterprise. Compared with value-maximizing policy, stockholders are inclined to overinvestment under the equity-maximizing investment policy, which affects the investment option value and optimal leverage choice, and does harm to the interests of bondholders. When debt constrained, the enterprise decreases the investment trigger first, and then increases it as con- straints become more binding.