摘要
基于投资行为具有信号传递功能和特性,从经理管理防御的角度,应用二期博弈分析模型对具有防御动机的经理人偏好投资于短期项目的深层次原因进行了深入分析,揭示出不同类型经理人管理防御的程度不同.为解释现实中企业投资短视行为提供了一个新的分析视角.
The paper used the model of two period game theory to analysis the inside reasons why the managers, who are entrenched, prefer the shorten investment than others. Based on the character of corporate investment behavior and its signal transferring function. This paper also show us the degree of managerial entrenchment associated with the type of managers. And providing a new angle to explain the realistic corporate investment myopia.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第11期55-61,共7页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(70872092)
关键词
管理防御
投资短视
博弈均衡
投资项目
managerial entrenchment
investment myopia
game equilibrium
investment project
