工程招标委托代理关系中的激励与监督

Analysis of the Incentive and Supervisory of the Principal-agent Relation in Engineering Tender Proxy

针对目前工程招标代理过程中产生的一些困惑招投标市场的问题,从招标人与工程招标代理机构的委托代理关系出发,在工程招标代理服务费为固定报酬的情况下,研究了信息不对称情况下工程招标代理机构的"道德风险"问题。通过建立数学模型,引入激励机制与监督机制来抑制"道德风险"。在此基础上,运用委托代理理论建立了工程招标代理合同中报酬支付的激励模型,提出了监督机制的若干具体措施。

In view of some questions that puzzled the bid market when the project tender proxy was carried out in our country, from the perspective of the principal - agent relation between the owner and the project tender proxy organization the ＂moral hazard＂ problem under the asymmetric information was studied. The mathematical models show that the moral hazard＇problem could be suppressed effectively by the introduction of the incentive mechanism and the supervising mechanism. On this basis, an incentive model of the payment in the engineering tender agency agreement was established, and some specific measures to the incentive mechanism were proposed.