论克里普克的先验偶然命题与后验必然命题

Chreaps'Prior Accidental Proposition and the Apodictic Proposition

自康德以来,人们,特别是康德主义者和逻辑实证主义者等总以为"先验的"就等同于"必然的","后验的"就等同于"偶然的",也就是说,"先验命题一定是必然命题,后验命题一定是偶然命题"。但是,克里普克却提出了"先验偶然命题"和"后验必然命题",也就是说,"先验的"并不一定是"必然的","后验的"也并不一定是"偶然的"。显然,克里普克的这个理论是与传统经验论观点相矛盾的,是对传统经验论的彻底打破,具有非常深远的历史意义。

Since Conde, a famous philosopher, people always thinks that there is a identity between the inevitable and accidentally. The prior proposition is certainly taken as the apodictic proposition. Chreap proposed the prior accidental proposition and the apodictic proposition . It is obvious that this theory is contrast to the traditional empiricism. But the theory is a break to the traditional philosophy and it has the extremely profound historical significance.