摘要
我国典型的M型层级结构下,农村义务教育投入的分权体制与全国性公共产品属性之间存在尖锐的矛盾,导致近30年农村义务教育投入体制从乡村自给向公共财政保障的变迁。农村义务教育投入体制演变以预算内资金增加和财政负担主体上移为特征,然而,中央政府介入程度的加深导致基层政府的预算约束软化,绩效损失不可避免。基于负担主体上移的收益与成本分析,目前可采取的策略是,在继续增加中央和省级政府投入的同时,逐步放弃"分项目、按比例"的转移支付方式,强化地方农村义务教育的预算约束。
Under typical Chinese M hierarchy, there is an inherent conflict between decentralization finance system of rural compulsory education and its national public goods attribute, which has led institutional changes from rural area selfsupport to public finance provision, characterized by increase of budget capital and moving the main body of responsibility up to the central fiscal department. However, increasing investment from central government makes local governments budget soft, and loss of performance inevitable. Considering the income and cost resulted by moving the main body of responsibility up to the central fiscal department, there are better policies: continue to increase central and provincial governments" inputs, at the same time, abandon transfer mean of payment according to "item and ratio" and strengthen budget constraint of rural compulsory education.
出处
《教育发展研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第23期43-47,共5页
Research in Educational Development
基金
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“公共财政框架下教育财政制度研究”(05JZD00033)的阶段性成果