论专名之间的同一性命题

On the Statements of Identity of the Proper Name

弗雷格认为,"a=a"和"a=b"这样的同一性命题明显具有不同的认识价值,后者有意义地扩展了我们的知识,因为"a"和"b"的意谓相同,但意义不同。克里普克不赞同弗雷格的观点。他认为,应该把同一性看作是某个东西与其自身之间的关系。在他看来,"长庚星就是启明星"这样的专名之间的同一性命题是后验的又是必然的。克里普克观点的主要依据是"专名是严格指示词,在不同的可能世界指示同一对象"。不过,从这样一个理论前提出发,能够证明象"长庚星是启明星"这样的命题是必然命题,却使得这样的命题具有先验命题的嫌疑。这是克里普克的理论所必然付出的代价。

Frege argued that there is different meaning of knowledge between such statements that ＂a = a＂ and ＂a = b＂. The latter expands our knowledge, because ＂a＂and＂b＂have same reference, and but they have different connotation. Kripke disargrees Frege＇s issue, and he argues that identity should just be taken to be the relation between a thing and itself. Kripke declares the identical statement of Hesperus is Phosphorus should be posteriori and necessary. The premise of Kripke＇s viewpoint is that the proper names are rigid designators which designate the same object in every possible worlds. According to the premise, we can demonstrate the statement of Hesperus is Phosphorus is necessary, however, we draw conclusion that the statement is priori. It is a necessary consequence that Kripke＇s theory brings about.