摘要
基于争议双方对仲裁人的裁决值有不同概率估计这一前提分析组合仲裁．构造了它的非合作对策模型．然后利用此模型，在多种情形下探讨了Ｎａｓｈ均衡报价策略的存在性，得出了组合仲裁不能诱导争议双方报价收敛的结论，这与Ｂｒａｍｓ和ＭｅｒｌⅢ在争议双方对裁决值有相同概率估计前提下获得的著名结论正好相反．最后分析了当一方变得风险厌恶时。
Based on the assumption that both disputants have different probability estimations to arbitrator′s decision, combined arbitration is analyzed and a non cooperative game with incomplete information is constructed. Existence of Nash equilibrium offer strategy is discussed for several cases, and the conclusion that combined arbitration can’t give the disputants an incentive to converge is achieved. Finally, we analyze the effect on both disputants offers when one of them becomes risk aversion.
出处
《自动化学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
1998年第1期56-63,共8页
Acta Automatica Sinica
基金
国家自然科学青年基金
中国博士后科学基金
关键词
仲裁
协商
不完全信息
非合作对策
NASH均衡
Nash equilibrium, arbitration, bargaining, incomplete information, non cooperative games.
