具有风险规避者加盟的供应链线性转移支付契约机制研究

Research on Linear Transfer Payment Contract Mechanism of Supply Chain with Risk-averse Agent

提出了具有风险规避者加盟的供应链协作线性转移支付机制。证明了零售商的风险规避效应在一定范围时,转移支付契约能够协调供应链,并进一步证明了供应商提供的奖惩因子要大于零售商为风险中性时的奖惩因子,同时确定了零售商为获得正激励的最低销售区间。随着零售商的风险规避效应增大,供应链越难协调。

To study the problem of supply chain collaboration with retailers of risk-averse, a linear transfer payment contract mechanism is proposed. It is proved that the supply chain can be coordinated when the risk-averse effect is restricted within a certain interval, and the reward and punishment factor offered by the supplier is greater than the risk-neutral incentive factor. Meanwhile, the interval of the least sales scale is determined. The supply chain is hard to coordinate with the retailer＇s risk-averse effect increasing.