链与链竞争的充分退货政策

Full return policies under chain to chain competition

关于退货政策的文献忽略了链与链竞争对退货政策的影响.文章应用博弈理论从链与链竞争角度研究退货政策对批发价格、零售价格、各方收益的影响,得到主要结论.其一,在产品替代程度不太高、低需求态概率低或低需求态概率高且市场波动幅度适度范围内时,充分退货政策改进了制造商与零售商的收益,并实现双赢.其二,当低态概率较高、市场波动幅度较大时,退货政策总体上强化了零售商之间和制造商之间的竞争.其三,在产品替代程度较低或产品替代程度较高且市场波动幅较大时,零售商将选择低需求态最优定价组合及订货策略;反之,零售商将选择低态出清定价组合及订货策略.

Current literatures on return policy overlook the issue of competition between supply chains. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the choice of return policy under competitive supply chains with game theory, and examine the impact of return policies on wholesale price, retail price, and profits of manufacturers and retailers. The main conclusions are drawn as follows. First, with full return policies, all manufacturers and retailers can improve their profits under the low substitutability and low probability for low demand state, or high probability for low demand state and moderate scope of variation. Secondly, full return policies will intensify the competition among manufacturers and retailers under the low probability for low demand state and extensive scope of variation. Thirdly, retailers will choose the optimal pricing under the low substitutability or high substitutability and extensive scope of variation, on the contrary, they will choose clearing pricing.