摘要
在实验的框架下分析了3种金融契约的激励约束功能.首先,根据金融契约内涵的现金流和控制权两种权利属性及其体现方式将金融契约激励约束效应划分为两类:即通过现金流权利属性体现的显性激励约束效应和通过控制权属性体现的隐性激励约束效应,在此基础上构建模型并运用实验研究方法实证检验了3种典型金融契约的激励约束效应及其差异.研究结果表明:权益契约的显性激励约束效应显著高于债务契约;相反,债务契约下通过控制权转移产生的隐性激励约束效应则显著高于权益契约;而可转债契约,则既能引发很高的投资者监督显性激励,又能对经营者产生很强的隐性激励约束效应.
We analyze the managerial incentive effect of three financial contracts through an experiment. We think that financial contracts can exert two categories of incentive effects including extrinsic effect, which is embodied through cash flow property, and intrinsic effect which origins from their control rights property. Based on this, we analyze empirically the differences in managerial incentive effects among three kinds of typical financial contracts and show that, the extrinsic effect of equity contracts is significantly higher than that of debt contracts, on the contrary, debt contracts provide much more intrinsic effect than equity contracts; and convertible debt contracts can provide both high extrinsic effect and high intrinsic effect.
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第6期131-142,共12页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572039
70772100)
教育部博士点资助项目(2006-26)
关键词
金融契约
管理者激励
显性激励约束效应
隐性激励约束效应
实验研究
financial contract
managerial incentive
extrinsic incentive effect
intrinsic incentive effect
experimental study
