高校后勤采购联盟联合采购模型与利益分配

A Model for Cooperative Purchasing and Profit Allocation in University Logistics Purchasing Alliance

采购联盟的利益分配是关系到联盟形成与维持的关键因素之一。本文首先构建了高校后勤采购联盟的联合采购模型;然后,在Heijboer和Fredo Schotanus的研究基础上,结合高校后勤联合采购的一个实际算例,探讨了按采购数量比例法(PV)、夏普利值法(SV)和折衷值法(CV)三种分配方法的公平性问题。研究结果显示:PV方法并不是一个理想的分配方法,它对联盟中采购量比较大的一方有利;基于博弈论的SV、CV方法由于能够满足大多数的公平分配性质,是一种能够得到较公平结果的分配方法。鉴于CV方法较SV方法简单,实践中建议采用该方法。

How to allocate the profits from cooperative purchasing is a key factor to the formation and maintaining of a consortium. This paper firstly establishes a cooperative purchasing model of University purchasing alliance. Based on the research of Heijboer and Fredo Schotanus, the paper then analyzes the fairness of the three allocation methods ： Proportional by Volume, Shapley Value and Compromise Value. The results show that Proportional by Volume is not a good solution to the problem of profit allocation, for it is in favor of the partner whose purchase quantity is large. However, Sbapley Value and Compromise Value are more equitable allocation methods than Proportional by Volume in that they satisfy more properties related to ＂fairness＂. At last, a conclusion is drawn that Compromise Value is superior to Shapley Value thanks to its simplicity in calculation.