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高薪能否养廉——一个模型分析 被引量:3

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摘要 在对政府雇员腐败行为做成本一收益的经济学分析时,工资是一个非常重要的分析因素,给政府雇员加薪以抑制腐败也是一种常见的政策建议,本文利用一个隐藏行动的逆向选择模型证明了高薪并不一定能养廉。
出处 《燕山大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 2008年第4期28-31,共4页 Journal of Yanshan University:Philosophy and Social Science
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