上市公司合谋行为的博弈分析

Analysis on the Listed Company's Collusive Actions Based on Game Theory

保护股东利益特别是中小股东权益,是证券市场完善的重要内容,也是证券监管的首要目标。本文通过区分所有者为知情和不知情两种类型,分析了转型经济中知情的控股股东与管理层合谋与监管问题。研究表明:在所有者都不知情的条件下,所有者监管的概率取决于监管成本、监管收益以及管理者可能进行合谋的概率;而管理者合谋的概率取决于合谋收益、所有者监管概率以及合谋失败后所带来的损失和惩罚;在所有者分为知情的内部大股东和不知情的、分散的外部小股东的时候,知情的监管者因为有合谋带来的收益,将会降低其监管的主动性,使合谋的概率上升。

Protecting shareholders＇ interests especially the small shareholders＇ rights and interests is an important content of the perfection of the stock market, and is also the chief target of the stock supervision. Through differentiating the proprietors to two types, this article analyzes the collusionand supervision problems between holding shareholders and managers who know all information in transitive economy. The researches indicate that under condition of the proprietors not knowing any information, their supervision probability rest on the supervision cost, income and collusion probability of the managers which lies on the collusion incomes, propnetors supervision prob- ability and the losses and punishes brought by the defeated collusion. When the proprietors are differentiated to inside - big shareholders and outside - small dispersive shareholders who don＇t know any information, the supervisors will reduce their supervision go - aheadism because of the incomes brought by collusion and make the collusion probability ascended.