供应链批发价与价格补贴的联合契约

Combined Contract of Supply Chain with Wholesale Price and Price Protection

针对随机需求的短生命周期产品,销售商仅有一次订货机会,销售分为两个阶段,第二阶段销售价格下跌,建立了供应链批发价与价格补贴的联合契约模型,分析了供应链协调条件,得到协调时对应不同新增利润分配比例的最优契约参数。然后作为联合契约特例研究了单纯的价格补贴契约。最后对单纯的价格补贴契约与联合契约进行了数值实验。研究表明:联合契约能够实现供应链协调;单纯的价格补贴契约能够激励销售商的订购量达到系统最优水平,但会损害供应商的利益,不能真正协调供应链。

This paper presents a model to analyze the combined contract of supply chain with wholesale price and price protection for short-lifecycle product, in which the retailer has only one ordering chance and selling their products with different marketing price in different selling periods. The condition to ensure channel coordination is derived, and the optimal parameters of contract are obtained given the proportion to allocate the coordination profit. Then the paper studies the price protection contact, which can be derived as the special case of the combined contract. The conclusion is that the combined contract can result in supply chain coordination, and the price protection contract can excite the retailer to order at the best level of supply chain but hurts the supplier severely. The price protection can not coordinate supply chain.