摘要
在英国配电公司第四次价格审查中,英国天然气和电力市场监管办公室对英国配电企业进行价格规制时所采用的是菜单合同的方法。该方法是基于拉丰的激励规制理论发展形成的,这个方法可以较好地解决在进行资本支出预测时规制者和受规制者之间的信息不对称问题,从而更好的对企业进行规制,制定出合理的上限价格。该方法在英国运用的非常成功,对我国电网的规制也提供了很好的借鉴意义。
During the price investigation in the Electricity Distribution Company of Britain for the fourth time, the menu of contract is adopted by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets （Ofgem） in the process of price regulation for British electricity distribution enterprises. On the basis of Laffont＇s incentive regulation theory, this method could help better solve the problem of information asymmetry between regulators and the regulated when the capital expenditure （eapex） is forecasted. So the Ofgem can achieve better efficiency in regulating the distribution company and setting suitable price cap. With great efficiency in the British experience, this method is a good reference to the price regulation of China＇s electricity network.
出处
《长沙理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2008年第4期5-8,共4页
Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology：Social Science
关键词
菜单合同
价格上限
资本成本
激励相容
menu of contract
price cap
capital expenditure
incentive compatible
