大股东制衡、投资者关系管理与盈余管理

Block Holder Counterbalance,Investor Relations and Earnings Management

以2005年深圳上市公司为研究样本,通过实证检验发现,集中持股、具有信息绝对优势的大股东有动机实施盈余管理,而其他股东(第二至第五大股东)或者由于权力有限,或者由于不热衷,导致其对大股东的制衡作用有限,对盈余管理的影响不明显。为此,上市公司可能会采取其他降低信息不对称的机制(投资者关系管理),来提高大股东盈余操纵被发现的概率。上市公司投资者关系管理水平越高,盈余管理程度就越低。投资者关系管理能够有效地制约大股东的盈余操纵行为,并对其他大股东的制衡作用产生替代效应。

This paper takes listed companies in Shenzhen as sample, studies the association among discretionary accruals, block holder counterbalance and investor relations. The authors found that block holders owning absolute information superiority had incentive to implementation earnings management, while other shareholders （the second largest shareholder to the tenth largest shareholder of the controlling shareholder ） had little balances power to block holders, which may be due to limited power or not enthusiastic. So companies may promote other mechanisms to reduce the information asymmetry. Investor relations do reduce information asymmetry. The higher lever of investor rations, the lower earnings management.