我国财政监督模式架构的过渡:行政型与立法型

Transition of Supervising Model of Finance in China:Administrative Model to Legislative One

我国现行的财政监督模式,是一种行政型财政监督模式。它在结构上呈现四边形的特点,具有较强的不稳定性。博弈分析表明,这种模式会导致政府失去外在约束,走向偷懒或违规。政府官员如将主要精力集中于处理上下级关系上,将不利于增加产出。因此。行政型财政监督模式需要向立法型财政监督模式转变。

Current financial superving model in China is administrative-financial one, the structure of that has the characteristic of Quadrilateral, and is not very stable. Analysis shows this pattern will induce government becomed lazy and gets out of line without external constraint. If government officials mainly focus on dealing with a superior- subordinate relationship, it will not benefit to increase their output. Therefore, the supervising model should be changed from administrative to legislative finance.