公用事业的多产品定价与政府规制:由上海观察

Multiproduct Pricing on Public Utility and Government's Regulation:Observing That of Shanghai

上海电力公司热电联供的热力价格调整案例表明,完全分配成本法可能会导致共同成本在热力与电力产品问的不合理分摊。而激励问题的存在将加剧共同成本的不合理分摊状况,最终结果是用户的福利受到损失。同时。政府的规制行为受到特定利益集团间的竞争驱动,并且规制者自身有着特定的利益目标,最终规制政策的出台实质上是利益集团间的博弈均衡。为此,寻求更为合理的多产品价格规制方法,以及如何保证利益集团博弈中的规制均衡成为一种社会合意的结果,成为多产品公用事业政府规制改革中的重要问题。

The price adjusting of the heating product in Shanghai Power indicates the fully distributed cost method will lead to the biased apportionment of common cost between the heating and power product. Meanwhile the incentive behavior of the regulated combined cooling heating and power suppliers in apportionment of the common cost will aggravate the biased apportionment, as the final result is that, the suppliers will be benefited and the consumer＇s welfare will be impaired. This case also shows that the guvernment regulation will be driven by the competition a- mong certain benefit groups and the regulator himself also has its own benefit goal, therefore the release of the regulation policy is essentially the game equilibrium of the benefit group. Thus, it is an important issue in the reform of regulation in multiproduct public utility to find out more reasonable multiproduct price regulation methods to ensure the regulation equilibrium in the game of benefit groups.