摘要
选取2006年在上海、深圳 A 股市场正式交易的150家上市家族企业为样本,并分为创业型家族企业和非创业型家族企业。研究表明,由于两类企业面临的代理冲突不一样,管理层持股的激励效果也不一致。创业型家族企业管理层持股对企业价值有正面影响,非创业型家族企业管理层持股比例与企业价值呈"倒 U型"关系。
The article has selected 150 listed family businesses of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market in 2006, which can be divided into venture family business and non-venture family business, and studied the relationship between managerial ownership and enterprise value of family businesses. The research results show that due to the different agent conflict of two types of enterprises, the effect of managerial ownership is different. Managerial owner- ship has positive impact on enterprise value in venture family business. Managerial ownership and enterprises value has inverted U-shaped relationship in non-venture family business.
出处
《改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第4期116-122,共7页
Reform
关键词
管理层持股
代理冲突
家族控制
企业价值
managerial ownership, agent conflict, family control, enterprise value