自主创新博弈:由政府与企业边界生发

Indigenous Innovation:Extension from the Game between Government and Firm

政府和企业作为两个不同层面的行为主体,在自主创新的利益诉求和选择逻辑上存在差异性。对创新的博弈均衡分析表明,企业在创新活动中存在行为偏好,而政府通过政策扶持对创新进行激励可以提高社会的整体福利水平。原始创新、集成创新和引进吸收再创新的难度、风险环节及其战略意义都不相同,因此政府在多种政策工具的制定和实施上,应该通过不同的政策组合提供有针对性的激励。

There are diversity upon the interest and choice preference of government and firm which are unique behavioral agents in the economic system. Based on the analysis of the game equilibrium in innovation, it presents firm has some preference on the innovation decision and the government＇s prompting policy will increase social welfare. The three type of indigenous innovation including original innovation, integrate innovation and re-innovation by introduction and absorption are different on the difficulty, risk and strategy value. Thereby, government should choose diverse policies to promote firms to innovate effectively.