企业网络组织稳定性的激励模型分析

Analysis of the Incentive Model on Stability in Network Organization

针对企业网络组织不稳定的问题,建立了单委托人-多代理人的激励模型,基于企业收益率可测性情况分别进行讨论。在求解的基础上对激励契约的效果进行比较分析,得出有关最优固定报酬和激励系数之间关系的一系列结论,提出了构造激励契约的建议。

A single-principal-muhi-agents incentive model on the stability problem in network organization is established. Then, a serial of conclusions about incentive of profit is gained based on the discussion of yield measurability. Finally, with the conclusion of this model, some suggests are also given on how to construct incentive effect.