基于跨期约束的供应链动态质量激励机制设计

Study on Dynamic Quality Incentive Model of Supply Chain Based on Intertemporal Constraints

针对供应链质量问题频发的现状,运用单阶段静态质量激励模型揭示了供应商质量投入动机不足的原因,并提出基于跨期约束的供应链动态质量激励机制。研究表明:在基于跨期约束的供应链动态质量激励模型中,博弈末期的双方最优决策与单阶段静态模型一致,即供应商的质量投入水平等于零售商对供应商的转移支付系数,而博弈第一阶段的供应商质量投入水平将大于零售商对供应商的转移支付系数,从而实现了零售商对供应商质量投入的有效激励。最后通过算例仿真验证了当零售商与供应商的绝对风险规避系数、随机冲击的波动增大时,基于跨期约束的动态质量激励模型的供应链总体效用要明显高于静态模型,实现了供应链绩效的帕累托改进。

This paper mainly considers the quality incentive mechanism in the supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer. Firstly,it makes use of a single--period quality incentive model to discover the deep--seated causation for lack of motivation in supplier＇s quality improvement devotion. And then con- structs a dynamic quality incentive model based on intertemporal constraints to intrigue supplier＇s quality devotion. The result of our research shows that, in the first period of the dynamic model, supplier＇s quali- ty devotion will just equal the slope of retailer＇s compensated wholesale price, but in the second period of the dynamic model, supplier＇s quality exceeds the slope of retailer＇s compensated wholesale price, thus displays the efficiency of the dynamic model on bestirring the supplier＇s quality devotion. Finally, the nu- merical analysis shows that the intertemporal quality incentive mechanism can greatly improve the total supply chain utility in contrast to the single--period mechanism.