期刊文献+

境内外交叉上市能限制大股东资金占用吗——基于我国上市公司的实证证据 被引量:2

Listed company in and outside China should liminted capital being used by large shareholder——demonstrative evidence basing on China listed company
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摘要 长期以来,大股东资金占用问题在我国资本市场一直难以根除。对此,本文以大股东非经营性资金占用清欠为背景,从一个全新的视角——境内外交叉上市进行研究。实证分析发现:我国交叉上市公司大股东较少占用上市公司资金,表明交叉上市公司较能保护小股东的利益,从而说明交叉上市有助于限制大股东资金占用。 It has been hard to ultimately solve the issue of asset appropriation by controlling shareholders in Chinese capital market for a long time. Accordingly, based on the background of the reimbursement of non-operational asset appropriation by controlling shareholders, this paper analyses this issue from a new angle of view--cross-listing. The empirical analysis finds that the controlling shareholders of cross-listed Chinese companies less appropriate the assets, showing that cross-listed companies can better protect the minority shareholders, and that cross-listing can constrain the controlling shareholders to appropriate the assets of the companies.
作者 朱志雄
出处 《特区经济》 北大核心 2008年第12期104-106,共3页 Special Zone Economy
基金 教育部哲学社会科学创新基地"南京大学经济转型和发展研究中心"子课题"对外开放与中国经济转型及发展研究"项目资助 国家自然科学基金项目(10471061)资助
关键词 大股东资金占用 境内外交叉上市 交叉上市公司 asset appropriation by controllingshare holders cross-listing cross-listed companies
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参考文献7

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共引文献5

同被引文献47

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二级引证文献9

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