通道费的避税效应与规制

The Tax Avoidance Effect and the Regulation of Slotting Allowance

收取通道费在我国已成为零售企业的一种盈利模式,而零售商向供应商滥收通道费引起我国当前工商矛盾尖锐化。本文分析了我国通道费的概念和构成,发现零售商收取通道费具有避税效应,这是我国通道费盛行的原因之一。由于通道费构成的复杂性,解决通道费问题不宜硬性取消或强制采取控制的规定,政府可以采用征收通道费税的办法予以规制。本文通过模型设计,得出调节通道费的控制变量,设计了针对通道费的征税机制,为政府规制零售商收取通道费行为提供了依据。

Enforced to pay retailers slotting allowance, suppliers undertake heavy loads, which results in the main problems between retailers and suppliers. This essay analyzes the concept of slotting allowance and the form of slotting allowance. The research finds the slotting allowance has tax avoidance effect. It results in that the slotting allowance is adopted by retailers widely. The form of slotting allowance is complicated and the slotting allowance has become a profit-making mode. To solve the problem, tax of slotting allowance, not the canceling or quantity-controlling methods, is highly recommended to governments. Throughout designing model, the paper provides a controlling variable to adjust slotting allowance and designs a taxation system aiming at the slotting allowance, which provides theoretical base for government to regulate the slotting allowance that retailers collect.