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“第一印象”的信息机制及其激励效应分析 被引量:2

Informational Mechanism of Primacy Effect and Its Incentive Scheme
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摘要 本文应用声誉机制模型分析"第一印象"效应的信息机制和激励效果。结果表明,在能力不变的条件下,越是初期表现越具有持久的影响,所以"第一印象"对代理人激励存在衰减效应,而在能力服从自回归序列变化的条件下,代理人的长期劳动供给得以改善,从而证明了"第一印象"长期激励效果不佳,以及增加工作挑战性、将第一印象与近因效应结合起来可以减少激励衰减效应的结论,对管理实践有重要的启示。 This paper applies the model of reputation mechanism into analysis of the informational mechanism and incentive scheme of Primacy Effect. It is shown that under the condition of time-invariant ability, early performance has permanent influence on the form of impression, while the incentive effect decreases as time goes on. Furthermore, when the ability follows self-regression process, the agent' s labor supply will be improved on in the stationary level. The conclusion of this paper formally approves the description of Primacy Effect, such as it' s deteriorating incentive effect in long-term view, the combination of Primacy Effect and recent performance will work more effectively, which shed light on management practice.
作者 刘广灵
出处 《中国软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第12期105-113,145,共10页 China Soft Science
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(79800017)
关键词 第一印象效应 信息机制 声誉机制 primacy effect informational mechanism incentive scheme
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参考文献28

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