摘要
商业贿赂是中国社会转型时期经济腐败现象最为重要的形式之一。我国为治理商业贿赂而全面启动的专项斗争产生了积极的效果。然而,构建于传统的、以"二元论"企业角色观为基础,以作为受贿主体的国家工作人员为规制重点的商业贿赂犯罪控制模式,并未切中商业贿赂犯罪"上游犯罪"之根本,具有一定的局限性。以"一元论"企业角色观为基础,以企业社会责任为视角,以作为行贿主体的企业及其工作人员为规制重点,提出商业贿赂治理新思路,并以此构建中国反商业贿赂长效机制,可以弥补传统治理商业贿赂思路的局限性。
Commercial bribery crime is one of the most important forms of economic corruption phenomenon in our social transforming period in China. Our country has taken special measures against commercial bribery crime comprehensively, and has achieved positive effect. However, present mechanism of controlling commercial bribery crime bases on the traditional theory of dualistic enterprise's role, which focuses on public servants as being bribees. Therefore, the mechanism does not hit the "upstream crimes" of commercial bribery crime completely, and has some limitation. So, we put forward a new mechanism which bases on the view of monistic enterprise's role along with corporate social responsibility, and focuses on the enterprises and their staff as being bribers. Furthermore, we establish a continently effective mechanism of controlling commercial bribery crime. We believe that it will remedy the limitation of the traditional mechanism.
出处
《政法学刊》
2008年第5期17-21,共5页
Journal of Political Science and Law
关键词
商业贿赂
犯罪控制
长效机制
commercial bribery crime, control of crimes, persistent effect mechanism