摘要
文件共享是P2P(Peer to Peer)网络最重要的应用之一.一直以来,free-riding是此类系统中一个难以解决的问题和研究的热点.针对以往的工作所存在的效率、可行性和公平性等各方面的不足,本文提出一种新的分布式的激励方案DIBA,方案能够为节点间的合作提供激励,并提高系统的整体收益.本文运用博弈论的思想从理论上对协议进行了分析.最后进行仿真并与Tit-for-Tat策略下的情况进行比较,结果表明DIBA能有效的提供激励和抵御多种自私攻击,并在效率上有较大优势.
Pile sharing is one of the most important applications of P2P network. Up to now, free-riding is a hard problem in these systems and hot point of research. Since most previous works have problems on efficiency, feasibility or fairness, this paper proposes a new distributed incentive protocol - DIBA, which provides incentive for nodes to cooperate and improves the overall utility of the system, This paper analyzes DIBA theoretically using game theory. Simulation and comparison with Tit- for-Tat strategy demonstrates that DIBA can effectively provide incentive and defend against several kinds of selfish attack and is superior to Tit-for-Tat strategy on efficiency.
出处
《小型微型计算机系统》
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第1期63-67,共5页
Journal of Chinese Computer Systems
基金
国家下一代互联网(CNGI)示范工程项目(CNGI-04-12-1D)资助