药品市场商业贿赂的不完全信息动态博弈模型

Economic analysis on commercial briberies in pharmaceuticals market of China:a game with incomplete information

选取我国药品市场销售中医院采购分销环节研究该市场上所存在的商业贿赂现象,指出该市场商业贿赂来源于药品市场自身的制度化特征。本文以Manion(1996)模型为基础,构造了一个不完全信息的动态博弈模型来刻画药品市场的制度化特征。认为当药品市场存在医院的"双重垄断"以及药厂与医院之间的信息不对称时,贿赂可能成为博弈的一个均衡结果。

This article focuses on one of the sales links in the pharmaceuticals market of China： hospitals procurement. The distinct aspects of commercial bribery that appears during hospitals procurement are proved to be relevant with some institutional features of pharmaceuticals market. A dynamic game model extended from Manion （1996） with incomplete information has been established to demonstrate this relevance. The conclusions of the article are： first, given hospitals as ＂Dual Monopolist＂, as well as asymmetric information between hospitals and producers, bribery may be one of the outcomes of the game.