摘要
为确保在证券发行中信息披露的真实完整和及时有效,以减少证券市场的信息不对称,通过对证券发行市场的参与主体监管者和发行者之间建立博弈模型,分析了在不同环境条件下发行者的最优信息披露策略和监管者的最优惩罚水平,以达到在即定条件下各方效用的最大化,并对如何降低证券发行中的信息欺诈水平提出了一些建议,以提高信息披露的真实性,促进证券市场的健康发展.
Securities issuing supervision is very important to the securities market development, and information disclosure is the center of securities issuing supervision, so how to assure issuer disclose the true information becomes main object of supervisor. This paper established a game model of securities supervi sion between issuer and supervisor and analyzed their optimum strategy. Some advice was given to reduce information cheating level and promote issuer to disclose true information.
出处
《上海交通大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第11期1780-1783,共4页
Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University
关键词
证券发行监管
信息披露策略
信息欺诈
securities issuing supervision
information disclosure strategy
information cheating