耐用品行业市场进入与产品创新策略的博弈分析

Game Theory Analysis of Strategies of Market Entry and Product Innovation in the Industry of Durable-goods

利用一个新产品古诺产量竞争的两阶段博弈模型,研究耐用品行业中在位者和潜在进入者的市场进入和产品创新策略,对企业的创新行为进行了福利分析.研究发现,在位者是否遏制进入取决于在位者和进入者的创新成本以及新产品的创新程度.产品创新可以提高在位者遏制进入的能力,新产品创新程度越大,遏制进入的好处越大、代价越低,在遏制进入时在位者越倾向于不进行产品创新.某些情况下,在位者的创新成本越大,遏制进入越困难.进入者的创新成本较小时,创新投资激励过度;较大时,创新投资激励不足;介于两者之间时,企业的选择与社会利益一致.

Using a two-period game model of Cournot quantity competition between new products, this article investigated the strategies of market entry and product innovation of incumbent and entrant in the industry of durable-goods, and made a welfare appraisal of firms＇ innovation behaviors. It is found that whether the incumbent deters entry depends on the innovation costs of incumbent and entrant, and the innovation extent of new products. Innovation can strengthen incumbent＇s capability of deterrence. If the innovation extent increases, advantages of deterrence will become greater, expenses of it will decrease and incumbent is apt to not innovate when entry is deterred. In some cases, if the innovation cost of incumbent increases, deterrence will become more difficult. When the innovation cost of entrant is low, there is excessive incentive of innovation investment; when it is high, the incentive is insufficient; when it is at middle level, the interests of firms are consistent with those of social planner.