股权分置改革后大股东与管理者合谋的博弈分析

Analysis on Collusive Game Between Large Shareholders and Managers after Shareholder structure Reform

股权分置改革完成后,中国上市公司的股权结构将发生重大变化,即实现股份全流通和股权分散化,特别是在上市公司实行股权激励计划后,出于和大股东相同的追求股权价值最大化的目的,管理层有可能成为虚假信息披露的直接提供者,与大股东合谋损害中小股东利益。利用核以及类Shapley值概念分析了两者合谋的根源和实现条件,结果表明:除了加强各自的收益、成本控制外,对其中一方参数(如持股比例)的控制会影响到另一方参与合谋的积极性,通过相互约束可以维护中小股东利益,从而实现上市公司的良性发展。

After share splitting reform, the ownership structure of China listed companies will change significantly. All of the shares will be tradable and the degree of ownership concentration will be lessened. Due to large number of listed companies carrying out stock and option incentive mechanism, managers will directly provide information disclosure fraud, with the same motive： i.e. pursuing for stock value maximization. Driven by the same motive, there will appear expropriation on the benefit of small and middle shareholders jointly taken by large shareholders and managers. According to the definition of core and quasi - Shapley value, this article analyzed the root and the realizable condition of collusion between large shareholders and managers. The results showed that besides strengthening the control of each return and cost, the parametric（for example, the equity ratio） control of one player＇s utility function may have an effect on the other＇ s collusive activity, and using mutual constraints to make the benefits of small and middle shareholders be ensured, so the listed companies will get a better development.