基于委托代理的高校教师学术寻租行为的博弈分析

Game Theory Model of College Teachers' Academic Rent-seeking Behavior Based on Principal-Agency Relation

高校和高校教师之间是一个标准的委托代理关系,由于学校与教师的信息不对称,当教师的行为不能被校方完全观察时,在自身利益最大化的驱使下,教师可以利用信息优势,产生机会主义行为的动机,将一部分精力用于学术腐败以达到学校规定的学术任务,我们称之为学术寻租行为。本文基于高校与教师的委托——代理关系,对教师的学术寻租行为建立博弈模型,并进行求解,提出治理高校教师学术寻租行为的政策建议。

There is a standard principal and agency relation between universities and their teachers due to information asymmetry between the two sides, when the behavior of teachers can not be fully observed by universities, and driven by the maximization of self-interest, teachers will have the opportunism motivation making use of their information advantage and put part of their effort in academic corruption to meet the academic requirement of universities, which is called academic rent-seeking behavior. Based on the entrust and agency relation between universities and teachers, a Game Theory model on teachers＇ academic rent-seeking behavior is built up and solved, then some policy recommendations on regulating the academic rent-seeking behavior of college teachers are offered.