摘要
基于信息不对称条件,通过引入社会扭曲成本与社会收益变量,解释了合作体成员可能出现的搭便车行为,并构建了互补性研发体成员在政府不同激励工具下的决策模型.研究表明,对于互补研发合作体的激励,政府不完全监督是最优的政策选择.运用中国合作创新的实际案例对所得结果进行了相关分析.
It establishes the incentive models in technology-complementing R＆D entity. Under asymmetric information, the models explain the free-riding behavior of the members in R＆D entity by introducing variables of distortion cost and social benefit. Through the analysis of the models, it proves that partial-monitoring policy is government＇s optimal choice on technology-complementing R＆D entity. A case of cooperative innovation in Chinese corporations is used to analyze the research conclusions.
出处
《研究与发展管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第6期16-22,共7页
R&D Management
关键词
逆向选择
扭曲成本
专利补贴
不完全监测
converse selection
distortion cost
patent subsidies
partial - monitoring
