论法称因明的逻辑体系

On Dharmakrti's System of Logic

本文以汉传因明的研究成果为基础,论证法称因明的演绎逻辑体系与陈那因明的非演绎逻辑体系有根本的差别。本文以玄奘的"唯识比量"作为标尺,论述法称因明在认识论、逻辑和辩论术三方面全面改造了陈那因明。论述了法称建立因后二相的思路与陈那有根本差别,是导致体系差别的根本原因。通过分析近似于"所闻性"因的实例,指出陈那的不共不定因在法称因明中不复存在。这是法称对陈那因明作体系性变革的重要特征。从法称《滴论》和法上疏找到根据,批评百年以来流行的归纳说。本文还找到了藏传研究者误用法称因三相来解读陈那因三相的原因。简明扼要地阐明不可得因在逻辑上没有独立性。设立此因主要为方便建立论式。文章最后解释了法称因明异法式独自成立的逻辑依据。要之,本文对当今国内因明研究中的诸多重要问题作出了自己的回应。

This paper is based on the author＇s recent studies upon the Buddhist logic （Het-uvidya） as preserved in China. It＇s aimed at bringing into light the fundamental differ- ences between Dharmaki rti＇s deductive system and Dignaga＇s non-deductive system. In it, the author tries to give his answers to a series of key questions raised in our contem- porary studies on Buddhist logic. The main points of this paper can be summarized as follows： 1. By taking Xuanzang＇s famous argument for the mere-consciousness theory （Vijnaptimatrarthanumana） as an important reference point, this paper tries to show Dharmakirti＇s sweeping reforms of Dignaga＇s epistemology, logic and dialectics as well. 2. Dharmakirti＇s new expression of the last two characters of reason, sapaksa eva sattvam and asapakse ＇sattvam eva, betrays his special consideration toward the relation-ship between the inferential reason and the property to be inferred, that is, observing the probandum from its probans, while Dignaga tries to observe the probans from its probandum. This difference seems to be fundamental in telling all the other differences between Dharmakirti and Dignaga. 3. Through the author＇s analysis of Dharmakirti＇s instance which is quite like the audible-reason （sravanahetu） for the sound-topic （sabdadharmin） but not the same, it＇s clear that Dignaga＇s theory about the fallacy of the non-common reason （asadharana） is no longer held by Dharmakirti. This fact then witnesses Dharmakirti＇s systematical revolution in Buddhist logic. 4. This paper criticizes the fashionable opinion that the three characters of reason （trairupya） present a process of induction in the Buddhist three-part inference （trayavayava）. This kind of opinion can be traced up to about 100 years ago, but it, as the author has found, contradicts with Dharmakirti＇s Nyayabindu and Dharmottara＇s Tika. 5. It＇s also mentioned in this paper the root of Tibetan scholars＇ misidentification of Dignaga＇s trairupya with Dharmakirti＇s. 6. This paper explains in brief that the reason of non-cognition （anupalabdhihetu） is not independent on the logical sense. To establish it is just for the sake of negation （pratisedha）. 7. Finally, this paper clarifies the logical base for the independence of the method of difference （vaidharmyavatprayoga） in Dharmakirti＇s logic.