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基于身份的认证群密钥协商协议 被引量：4

ID-based Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocol
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摘要 认证群密钥协商(AGKA)协议能为一群用户产生一个共享的会话密钥,使得群用户间能在公共数据网络进行安全通信。现有的大部分基于公钥技术的AGKA协议可分两类:第一类,认证部分是基于PKI/CA,会话密钥协商部分主要用模指数(或点乘)实现;第二类,认证部分是基于身份(ID)的公钥体制,会话密钥协商部分主要是用Weil对或Tate对实现。第一类AGKA协议存在一个较显著问题:公钥管理问题;第二类AGKA协议虽然有效地解决了公钥管理问题,但由于其会话密钥协商部分主要是用双线性对(即Weil对或Tate对)实现,与前者相比,计算量较大。针对这些不足,提出了一个新的AGKA协议,其认证部分是基于身份(ID)的公钥体制,会话密钥协商部分的运算主要用模指数实现;并在ROM,ECDH和BDH假设下证明了该AGKA协议的安全性。该协议与基于PKI/CA的相关AGKA协议相比,克服了后者在密钥管理上的困难;与其它基于身份的AGKA协议相比,在效率上具有一定的优势。 An authenticated group key agreement （AGKA） scheme allows a group of users in a public network to share a session key which may later be used to achieve desirable secure communication. According to various authentication flavors by using asymmetric techniques, the previous AGKA protocols are sorted PKI/CA-based ones that most cost of computation is modular exponentiation （or dot multiplication） and ID-based ones which are implemented by using pairing. Compared with PKI/CA-based AGKA, ID-based authenticated AGKA simplifis the key agreement （management） procedures. Whereas they require expensive computation cost than PKI/CA-based AGKA protocols. Aiming at the weaknesses of the two kinds of AGKA protocols, a novel ID-based AGKA protocol was proposed that was implemented by using dot multiplication.
作者 李国民 何大可
机构地区 西南交通大学信息安全与国家计算网格实验室 现代通信国家重点实验室
出处 《计算机科学》 CSCD 北大核心 2009年第1期60-64,共5页 Computer Science
基金 现代通信国家重点实验室基金(No.151436050404QT2202)资助
关键词 认证群密钥协商协议 会话密钥 双线性对 Authenticated group key agreement protocol, Session key, Pairings
分类号 TP393.08 [自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术] TN915.04 [电子电信—通信与信息系统]
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参考文献30

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共引文献216

同被引文献48

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