摘要
通过两阶段的博弈分析,得出承包商在施工的过程中,实际的施工质量水平往往低于业主在招标文件中规定的施工质量水平;而在投标阶段,成包商往往根据对实际可采用的施工质量水平的预期,进行投标报价,从而在某些情况下,低价中标的招标机制中,高成本的承包商也可能中标.
In the text, an analytical framework was developed to investigate the implications of opportunism about quality on bidding. The model of two-stage-game was built,and got that the level of quality in the building is a bit lower than asked by the tender in the contract. In the course of tending, bidders price their bid according the prospective quality of building. So in the mechanism of the minimum price get the object, the bidder who has the higher cost can also get the contract in some case.
出处
《武汉工程大学学报》
CAS
2009年第1期83-85,90,共4页
Journal of Wuhan Institute of Technology
关键词
双寡头竞争
博弈论
承包商
质量
低价中标
duopoly
game theory
contractor
quality
the minimum price get the object
