新兴战略性产业的进入管制与管制绩效——以我国手机“牌照制度”的实践为例

The Entry Regulation and Its Performance of Emerging Strategic Industry——Example of Handset Licence System in China

本文建立了一个简单的进入管制模型,并以信产部的手机"牌照制度"的实践为例,分析了新兴战略性产业的进入管制与管制绩效。本文发现,与认为进入管制容易引发垄断低效率的传统观念不同,在开放经济下新兴战略性产业初期由于外部性和高风险而导致本国企业进入不足;进入管制能够为先驱企业提供某种"专利"租金的机会,从而有助于企业提高产量,降低价格,增加社会总剩余。从长期来看,进入管制存在成本和容易激发企业的短视行为而影响产业效率,因此有必要逐步放开管制。另外,建立明确的竞争程序和规则来挑选进入者也是提高管制绩效的重要方面。

This paper analyses entry regulation and its performance of emerging strategic industry by establishing a simple entry regulation model. With example of handset licence system in China, we find that domestic enterprises entry is always deficient for external economy and risk during early stage of emerging strategic industry in open economy. Entry regulation can provide patent rent opportunities for pioneer enterprises, and encourage them to increase output, reduce price and improve social surplus. While entry regulation also impairs industrial performance for high regulation costs and brings about short sight behavior of enterprises for long term. Therefore, gradual deregulation is necessary. In addition, establishing unambiguous rules to select entrant is very important for improve regulation performance.