股权制衡与上市公司派现水平的联动关系研究

Interactions between Shareholders' Balance Mechanism and Level of Listed Companies' Cash Dividends

基于股权结构内生性的假定,采用面板数据动态地研究了上市公司的派现行为对股权制衡的影响,研究发现公司中小股东并不把上市公司的派现行为(至少是正常派现)视为控股股东的掏空方式,在控股股东完全控制的上市公司这种情况更为显著。考虑到股权结构在静态指标上表现出外生性的一面,同时采用联立方程模型研究发现股权制衡与上市公司派现水平之间存在着联动作用:派现水平越高,上市公司的股权制衡度越低;股权制衡度越低,上市公司的派现水平越高。

On the basis of endogeneity of the ownership structures, panel data were used to show the dynamic effect of Chinese Listed Companies＇ cash dividend distribution behavior on the shareholders＇ balance mechanism. It is seen that minority shareholders don＇t perceive cash dividends, at least normal level of dividends, as controlling shareholder＇s expropriation behavior, especially in companies that controlling shareholders dominant. Considered the ownership structures＇ exogenous feature, a Simultaneous Equations Model was used to show the interactions between cash dividends and shareholders＇ balance mechanism. It is found that the higher level of Chinese Listed Companies＇ cash dividends, the lower degree of balance among shareholders; the lower degree of balance of shareholders, the higher level of companies＇ cash dividends.