大股东控制与会计稳健性——来自中国A股上市公司的实证检验

Major Shareholders Control and Accounting Conservatism——Positive Test from Chinese A-share listed Companies

从供给与需求的角度就大股东控制对会计稳健性的影响进行理论分析,并引入股权结构变量,对Basu(1997)模型、Ball和Shivakumar(2005)模型进行修正后,通过构建一个检验体系,对大股东控制与会计稳健性的关系进行实证分析。研究显示,大股东控制与会计稳健性显著负相关,而且这种负相关关系并不对控制人性质敏感。这一结果表明,在我国这样的新兴市场中,股权结构对会计稳健性具有显著影响,大小股东之间的利益冲突已经成为我国上市公司中日益突出的代理问题,不管是在国有控股还是在非国有控股公司,大股东控制都具有显著的"壕沟防御效应"。

This paper analyzes the problem in theory from the perspective of supply and demand, and then considering the variable of shareholding structure into Basu （1997） model and Ball and Shivakumar （2005） model, building a test system for the empirical analysis of the relationship between major shareholders control and accounting conservatism. Based on the data of Chinese A- share listed companies, the resuits show that major shareholders control and accounting conservatism show the significant negative correlation, and this correlation is not sensitive to the nature of major shareholders. This shows in China, an emerging market, shareholding structure has significant impact on accounting conservatism, and conflict of interest between major shareholders and minority shareholders in China＇ s listed companies has increasingly become prominent agency problem, whether in the state- controlled or non- state - controlled companies, major shareholders control has ＂ Entrenchment Effects.＂