公司治理前沿研究综述——大股东控制、隧道行为、隐性收益与投资者保护被引量：8

A Review on Corporate Governance Theory——The Control of Large Shareholders,Tunneling Effect,Private Benefits & Investor Protection

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摘要本文回顾了公司治理领域关于大股东控制问题的最新研究成果,主要包括大股东控制存在的普遍性、大股东控制权与现金流权的分离模式、大股东控制的激励效应和隧道效应,以及投资者保护问题等。梳理了该领域的研究脉络,并对主要发现和结论进行了总结和评论。文献研究表明,股权集中的内在机制在于大股东有动力和机会增加所有股东都可以获得的共享收益,而且大股东可以通过消耗公司资源来获得小股东无法分享的控制权隐性收益,并导致企业价值的下降。高效的投资者保护机制能够在一定程度上抑制大股东侵害小股东利益的隧道行为,提升企业价值。 The control of large shareholders has been become the hotspot problem of theory ＆ experience research in the kingdom of economics ＆ Corporate finance. This paper reviews the newest results about the problem of large shareholders＇ control in the region of corporate governance,mainly including the universality of large shareholders＇ control, the pattern of separation of control rights ＆ cash flow rights, the incentive effect ＆ entrenchment effect of large shareholders＇ control. We sum up the skeleton of these study, ＆ summarize ＆ comment on the main find ＆ conclusion. This paper suggests that the inner mechanism of share concentration is that larger shareholders have the motivation ＆ chance to increase the sharing benefits which can be obtained by all shareholders, ＆ that larger shareholders can snatch private benefits which can＇t be shared by small shareholders through stealing the resource of firms, while the firms＇value decreases. Investor protection can decreases the tunneling behavior of larger shareholders ＆ inceases the corporate value.

作者何骏张祥建

机构地区上海财经大学财经研究所

出处《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第23期165-171,共7页 Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基金教育部人文社会科学研究项目"我国现代服务业发展的多重模式研究"(08JC790064) 上海市重点学科建设项目(B802)。

关键词大股东控制激励效应隧道效应隐性收益投资者保护 the control of large shareholders incentive effect tunneling effect private benefits investor protection

分类号 F830.91 [经济管理—金融学]

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