摘要
从内部治理结构角度出发,在传统模型基础上,引入能够综合反映公司治理有效性的经理自主权,构建了基于经理自主权的报酬业绩敏感性模型,并据此分析出经理自主权能够负向操纵其报酬业绩敏感性的结论,提出了相应的对策建议。
From the view of internal governance structure, the paper introduces managerial discretion as a variable most comprehensively reflecting corporate governance quality degree into traditional Hermalin Model and constructs a decisive model of CEO pay - performance sensitivity based on managerial discretion, according to which a conclusion holding that managerial discretion affects CEO pay -performance sensitivity negatively is drawn.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第1期94-98,共5页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70372052)
西安理工大学高学历人才科研启动基金资助项目(107-210713)
关键词
报酬业绩敏感性
经理自主权
公司治理
pay- performance sensitivity
managerial discretion
corporate governance
