期刊文献+

基于自我归因偏差的企业团队生产合作问题研究 被引量:2

Research on Team Production Coordination of Enterprise Based on Self-attribution Bias
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摘要 将行为经济学理论与团队生产理论相结合,在考虑团队成员自我归因偏差的条件下,通过建立合作模型,研究企业团队生产中各成员的努力工作程度、最优激励机制以及任务分配,并分析了自我归因偏差对团队生产的动态影响。结果表明,团队成员存在相互依赖关系时,部分成员所表现的自我归因偏差不但使其自身对工作热情更高,而且会感染给其他成员,从而降低团队合作道德风险,并提高企业效益。此外,随着工作经验的丰富,团队成员将趋于理性,自我归因偏差对团队生产的影响会逐渐减小。该结论在企业选拔团队成员、实施团队激励以及任务分配等方面的运用,能够有效促进团队合作。 By combining the behavioral economics theory and the team production theory, the paper researches the team members' effort, the incentive contracts, and the job assignments in enterprise' team production based on the self-attribution bias. The result shows that only part of the team members with self-attribution bias will affect all of the members 'effort, alleviate the moral hazard problem and improve the enterprise' s benefit. Moreover, along with the enrichment of working experience, team members will become rational, and the effects of self-attribution bias on team production will get smaller and smaller. The application of this researching conclusion in enterprise to selecting team members, providing incentive contracts and assigning jobs will promote team coordination effectively.
作者 王健 庄新田
出处 《预测》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第1期15-22,共8页 Forecasting
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871022) 高等学校博士点专项基金资助项目(20060145001)
关键词 自我归因偏差 团队生产 激励机制 任务分配 self-attribution bias team production incentive contracts job assignments
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参考文献19

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