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股权分置改革方案的市场效应检验——基于中国证券市场的经验证据 被引量:1

Research on Market Effect of Split-share Structure Reform:Based on Empirical Evidence from Stock Market in China
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摘要 我国股权分置改革中上市公司非流通股股东对流通股股东的对价支付是为了解决股权分置问题、促进资本市场健康发展的一种制度安排。本文以截至2007年12月31日完成股权分置改革并复牌的上市公司为样本,对股权分置改革方案的市场效应进行实证研究。研究发现:股权分置改革显著提升了上市公司的市场绩效,客观上将上市公司与非流通股和流通股的利益更紧密地联系在一起;在上市公司股改对价支付的各种方案中,送股方式的市场效应最显著,派现与其他对价支付方式的市场效应较小。 The corresponding value from nonnegotiable stock shareholders to negotiable stock shareholders of listed companies in China is one kind of system arrangement dealing with the issue of split-share and promoting the healthy development of the capital market in China. Taking the listed companies finished split-share structure reform and recovered by the end of Dec 31,2007 as samples, this paper empirically studies the market effect of split-share structure reform. The research shows: split-share structure reform improves the market performance of listed compa- nies evidently,and strengthens the interest link between the nonnegotiable stock shareholders and the negotiable stock shareholders of listed companies;the stock-paid method has noticed market effect, and the cash-dividend and the other corresponding value methods have less market effect.
作者 彭代武 高燕
出处 《技术经济》 2009年第1期85-91,共7页 Journal of Technology Economics
关键词 股权结构 股权分置改革 对价 市场效应 stock rights structure split-share structure reform corresponding value market effect
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