摘要
跨国公司往往通过使用排他性销售渠道(ED)或者纵向一体化(VI)进入东道国并进行竞争。这两种竞争策略的相似性和不完全替代性,使之成为本文的分析对象。在同一个东道国进行竞争的两个生产相似产品的寡头,当一方欲领先一步,应选择何种竞争策略来先动;当竞争对手先动选择一个竞争策略时,己方采取何种策略才能减少甚至摆脱后发劣势。本文通过建立两寡头Stackelberg数量竞争模型分析表明,跨国公司现实竞争中对于VI或者ED的偏好决不是偶然,而是经过理性博弈后的一种均衡。
It is common for muhinational corporations to choose such strategies as exclusive dealing （ED） or vertical integration （VI） to compete in the host countries. The two strategies are selected out for research because of their similarities and non-substitutability. When competing as duopolists in a host country, how should the last mover response to the first mover？ Can this choice help get rid of the backwardness？ By setting up a Stackelberg Model, we conclude that it is by no means accidental for the multinational corporations to have special preference towards VI or ED. And it is equilibrium through rational gaining.
出处
《当代经济管理》
2009年第1期15-22,共8页
Contemporary Economic Management
关键词
纵向一体化
排他性销售
后发劣势
exclusive dealing
vertical integration
last mover disadvantage
