公平规范与自然资源保护——基于进化博弈的理论模型

Fairness norm and natural resources conservation:a theoretical study based on evolutionary game model

传统理论认为社区对公共自然资源的管理必然导致"公共地悲剧"。但新近研究证明个人行为往往受到社会规范的影响并遵循公平互惠等"非理性"原则,进而指出社群有可能自发实现对公共资源有效的合作保护。基于这一思路,综合运用进化博弈论与行为经济学理论构建数学模型模拟了社区居民参与对自然资源的家庭承包管护的策略演化动态,并分析公平规范在该过程中能够发挥的潜在作用。结果表明在经济补偿相对管护所需劳动成本较为有限的情况下,"理性"的参与者无法长期维持高水平的保护合作;相比之下,如果公平规范对当地居民有较强的约束力,则可以实现更高的保护合作水平,其最终均衡由群体中对公平有较高要求的参与者比例决定。这一结果从理论上预测了利用公平规范推动社区参与自然资源保护合作并提高生态补偿效率的可行性。

Due to the concern with the ＂tragedy of the commons＂,the capacity of community governance is usually underrated in natural resource management such as the natural forest onservation.Nevertheless,the recent studies indicated that the individual′s behavior is bounded-rational and follows social norms such as fairness.In this study,we developed a mathematical model based on evolutionary game theory and behavioral economics,simulated the evolutionary dynamics of the strategies the local people could choose in the context of family-contracted natural resource conservation,and analyzed the role that the fairness norm could play in the conservation program.The result indicated that the rational players are not able to sustain a high level of cooperation for conservation when the material subsidy is only limited and comparable to the costs needed for monitoring;in contrast,improved level of cooperation is possible if the local people comply with the fairness norm,and the convergent equilibrium is determined by the proportion of the players who highly regard the value of fairness.The result in theory predicted the availability of facilitating the participation and cooperation of the local community in the common resource conservation by crowding in the fairness norm with the ecological compensation policies.