摘要
控制权利益虽然在配股和增发中发挥着重要的作用,但本文研究发现,可转债债券属性的潜在约束和转换期权的不确定性对控制权利益起一定的抑制作用,控制权利益在上市公司可转债融资中不起主导作用。可转债债券属性对控制利益的潜在约束作用明显,我国可以适度发展可转债融资来抑制资本市场上较普遍的控制权利益。
Private benefit control plays a major role in dividing shares and issuing additional shares. However, the study in this article shows that the potential restriction of convertible bond feature and the uncertainty of convertible option restrain the private benefit control and the private benefit control does not play a dominant role in financing via convertible debts by listed companies. Since the property of convertible bonds has a distinct constraint on private bonefit control, China can properly use financing via convertible debts to inhibit the universal private benefit control on capital market.
出处
《河北经贸大学学报》
北大核心
2009年第1期93-96,共4页
Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business
关键词
可转债
控制权利益
债券性
期权性
convertible bond
private benefit control
bond
option