服务跳变抗DoS机制的博弈理论分析

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Service Hopping Mechanism for DoS Defense

该文对DoS攻防进行不完全信息博弈分析,讨论了DoS防范的困境,指出信息的不对称性和未能形成服务方-用户联盟是防范困境的根本原因。通过引入服务跳变策略,增加服务类型并建立服务方-用户联盟,即可构造新的DoS攻防博弈均衡,理论上证明了服务跳变策略具有主动的抗DoS特性,对于服务跳变与DoS主动防范策略研究具有理论意义。

A game-theoretic analysis of security interactive behavior is performed between the DoS attacker and the defender under incomplete information. The dilemma of defense is discussed and the underlying fact is revealed that asymmetric nature of information and absence of server-user coalition lead to the dilemma. An improved DoS game is performed which can acquire new equilibrium through service hopping tactic, increasing service type and establishing the server-user coalition. Theoretical analysis shows that service hopping tactic is active and efficient for DoS defense. It is fundamental and important for service hopping mechanism and DoS defense.