财政分权体制下的地方政府行为与中国经济增长——基于转型期的实证研究

Local Government Behavior and Chinese Economic Growth in the Financial Decentralization System

以财政收支活动为具体体现的地方政府行为是在特定财政体制框架内,对财政资源在中央、地方和各微观经济主体(包括企业和个人)之间的筹集和分配,其实质是对诸多社会利益主体产权边界重新划分、界定而使其达到均衡。笔者从包含公共支出的内生增长模型,推出了反映宏观税负与经济增长关系的Laffer曲线;并利用转型期分省宏观经济数据对Laffer曲线进行了实证检验,揭示出宏观税负过重不利于经济增长的结论。

The local government behavior which is embodied in fiscal revenue and expenditure is the raising and distribution of financial resources among the central government, local governments and every micro economic body within specific financial system frame, and its essence is redividing and defining the bodies of social benefits and achieving equilibrium. From the endogenous growth model containing public expenditure, the author derives the Laffer curve which shows the relationship between macro tax and economic growth and then makes an empirical test of the Laffer curve by using the macro economic data of each province in the transformational period, and draws the conclusion that heavy macro tax is harmful to economic growth.