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涉他偏好效用理论研究述评 被引量:1

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摘要 "最后通牒"等一系列行为博弈实验显示,人们在追求自身收益的同时也会关注其他人的收益。而在此基础上发展的涉他偏好效用理论,成功解释了大量传统经济理论所不能解释的实验结果和经济现象,并能更为准确地预测经济行为。该文对目前涉他偏好效用理论的主要模型——互惠意图模型、不公平厌恶模型和社会福利偏好模型进行研究、比较和分析,为解决我国经济改革和经济转型中公平、互惠和社会效率等方面问题提供所需的理论依据。
作者 郭心毅 陈斌
出处 《现代经济探讨》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第1期81-84,88,共5页 Modern Economic Research
基金 国家社会科学基金项目<和谐社会的微观经济理论研究>(项目编号:07BJY017)的中间研究成果。
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参考文献11

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共引文献99

同被引文献18

  • 1周小亮,笪贤流.效用、偏好与制度关系的理论探讨——反思消费者选择理论偏好稳定之假设[J].学术月刊,2009,41(1):75-85. 被引量:25
  • 2叶航,汪丁丁,罗卫东.作为内生偏好的利他行为及其经济学意义[J].经济研究,2005,40(8):84-94. 被引量:150
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