基于共同治理模式下的银行公司治理结构

The Corporate Governance Structure of Commercial Bank Based on Co-governance Pattern

从公司治理结构的理论和实践发展经验看,企业公司治理模式的选择受到股权结构、市场发育程度和制度环境等多种因素的制约。单纯强调"股东至上主义"思想的单边治理模式与银行的稳健经营原则是相矛盾的,它必然削弱债权人对管理层监控的动力和能力。考虑到我国商业银行股权比较集中,国有股权比例较大,金融市场发育程度远低于西方发达国家以及金融业实行分业监管等基本现实,我国的银行业更适合选择利益相关者理论所倡导的多边共同治理模式。在充分考虑利益相关者的基础上,保持各方利益的均衡,构建一个反映我国银行业发展特点、各利益相关方共同参与、相互制衡的多边"共同治理"模式。

According to the theory and practice of corporate governance, the selection of suitable corporate governance pattern is constrained by many factors, such as ownership structure, the degree of market development, institutional environment, and so on. The unilateral governance model simply focusing on the shareholder-oriented thinking is contradicted to the moderate operation principle of banks, because such model will inevitably weaken creditors＇ motivation and capability to monitor bank＇s management. Chinese commercial banks generally have high ownership concentration and high state-owned equity ratio. Moreover, the develop- ment degree of Chinese financial market is far behind that of western developed countries and Chinese banking is still implementing separate supervision. This situation decides that a co-governance model, initiated by stakeholder theory, is more suitable to Chinese banking. On the basis of fully considering and balancing the interests of all stakeholders, Chinese banking can establish a co-governance pattern to reflect its own developing characteristics and achieve stakeholders＇ mutual participation and constraint.